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1 Introduction
The recent ‘food crisis’ in 2008 starkly demonstrated the importance of global com-
modities markets. In particular, sharply rising prices for commodities such as wheat,
maize, rice and oil pushed many vulnerable groups deeper into poverty (see Ivanic and
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Martin, 2008).1 In any case, the behaviour of primary commodity prices is typically
important to many developing countries, wherein a significant proportion of national
income is often generated by a small number of primary products (see Harvey et al.,
2010).2 The nature and causes of movements in primary commodity prices therefore
have significant implications for growth and poverty reduction policies in developing
countries.
Analysis of long-run commodity prices is dominated by the Prebisch-Singer (PS)
hypothesis which implies a secular, negative trend in commodity prices relative to
manufactures.3 Possible theoretical rationales include low income elasticities of de-
mand for commodities, asymmetric market structures that result from comparatively
homogeneous commodity producers generating highly competitive commodity markets
whilst facing oligopolistic manufacturing markets, and technological and productiv-
ity differentials between core (industrial) and periphery (non-industrial) countries. If
a country’s export commodities present long-run downward trends in their relative
prices, the policy advice is typically to diversify the export mix to include significant
proportions of manufactures and/or services. Additionally, as is noted in Arezki et al.
(2014a), understanding the trend and other time series characteristics should enable
improved forecasting of commodity price movements.
Empirical evidence examining the PS hypothesis provides an ambiguous picture.
The vast majority of recent studies employ the Grilli and Yang (1988) dataset of 24
annual non-fuel primary commodity prices which commences in 1900.4 However, the
1In 1990-1992, it was estimated that 817 million people, approximately 20% of the global popula-
tion, were undernourished. In 2005-2007, this was estimated to be 830 million people, around 16%.
However, with current estimates at more than one billion undernourished people, this represents a
return to approximately 20% of the world population (see Millennium Development Goals Report,
2010).
2For example, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators suggests that primary commodities
contributed 50% of the total merchandise exports of developing countries in 2007. Strikingly, reliance
on primary commodities is even higher in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Higher Indebted Poorer Coun-
tries, accounting for approximately 66% and 80% of merchandise exports respectively.
3See Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950).
4Earlier work, not employing the GY dataset, includes Spraos (1980), Sapsford (1985) and Thirwall
and Bergevin (1985).
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relatively large variance of commodity prices (see Deaton, 1999) and the possibility
of trend structural breaks inhibits statistical determination of any trend magnitude
and direction with this sample size. A possible approach to address this issue is to
provide greater degrees of freedom via a backwards extension of the sample. Recently,
Harvey et al. (2010) and Arezki et al. (2014b) employ a unique disaggregated dataset,
comprised of 25 separate commodity time series and spanning the 17th to the 21st
centuries.
Although there is a large body of literature examining the veracity of the PS hypoth-
esis, there are far fewer attempts to establish a plausible rationale for any estimated
trend and associated breaks. In many ways, this is understandable; reliable histori-
cal data on possible causal variables such as technology differentials, relative market
structures or income elasticities of demand are clearly difficult to source. However, the
primary goal of this chapter is to explore the causal underpinnings of long-run com-
modity prices and hence to provide input to long-range forecasting and policy design.
To circumvent the lack of data we suggest a threefold approach. Firstly, aggregate
measures of relative commodity prices would be useful over a very long time frame.
An aggregate measure of commodity price movements should smooth the idiosyncratic
effects of individual commodity prices and provide a summary series shaped primar-
ily by common factors. Secondly, the time series characteristics of these new series
can subsequently be cross-referenced with the existing economic history literature to
elucidate possible common factors. Finally, we suggest that the trend growth rate of
economic activity, data that is available over an historical timeframe, is a useful proxy
for these common factors (see, for example, Sachs and McArthur, 2002).
In this chapter, our first contribution is to collect a large historical dataset on the
export values of 23 individual commodities; not a straightforward task. This new
data is then used as weights when combined with updated individual commodity series
from Harvey et al. (2010) to create aggregate annual series beginning in 1650 and
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running continuously until 2010. Subsequently, our second contribution is to use the
new aggregate series to examine the statistical properties of relative commodity prices
over the very long-run. Given the well known problems of identifying the order of
integration of price series, and the pervasive influence of any unit root/stationarity
pre-tests on subsequent tests of commodity time series characteristics (see Harvey et
al., 2010), we apply trend tests and multiple trend break tests which are robust to
whether or not the series under consideration contains a unit root. The results show
that the trend path of our new aggregate series can be split into four regimes (i.e., 1650
to the early 1820s, the early 1820s to the early 1870s, the early 1870s to the mid-1940s,
and the mid-1940s to 2010). Through all but the second regime, a long-run downward
trend can be clearly detected, giving new historical support to the PS hypothesis.
Our understanding of the regimes suggested above can be deepened by the extant
economic history literature. For example, the 19th century terms of trade boom in
the poor periphery suggested by Williamson (2008) is formally dated by our analysis
as existing during our second regime from the 1820s to the 1870s. It is suggested this
singular boom was driven by factors such as growing demand from the industrialising
core of European countries, falling transport costs, technological innovations in manu-
facturing and the associated liberalisation of trade. In a sense, this is analogous to the
early 21st century, as China, India and other emerging nations rapidly industrialise,
shifting upward the demand curve for a range of primary commodities. This reminds
policymakers and forecasters that prices can remain above trend for many years before
returning to a long-run negative growth path and that care should be taken not to
treat increases in export income as permanant.
Our third contribution is to examine whether trend breaks in commodity-relevant
economic activity coincide with those previously identified for relative commodity
prices. It is shown that UK GDP presents an upward trend break in the 1820s and
World GDP in the 1870s and 1950s. These dates are closely associated with those
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found for commodity prices. Additionally, it should be noted that although relative
commodity prices present a secular decline over the 17th and 18th centuries, this was
at a slower rate as compared with the 20th century. This is matched by the increasing
rate of trend growth in economic activity as the sample increases suggesting that the
economic forces behind the PS hypothesis intensified during the 1900s and are captured
by the trend rate of GDP.
How does this add to our current understanding of commodity price movements?
The theory of such movements are currently not well developed or evidenced (see
Deaton and Laroque, 2003). Important recent work such as Erten and Ocampo (2013)
primarily concentrates on medium-run or cyclical movements around the long-run
trend. Building on the idea that changes in demand influence cyclical movements
around the trend, they provide some empirical evidence that commodity price super-
cycles follow World GDP over the period 1865 to 2010. On the other hand, Deaton and
Laroque (2003) derive a more formal model with a supply function that adjusts posi-
tively to the gap between the current market price and some constant long-run mean.
Theoretically, it can then be shown that supply, not economic activity, is cointegrated
with commodity prices. In both cases, the underlying long-run trend in commodity
prices itself is removed or assumed equal to zero. In this chapter, we provide new evi-
dence that this long-run trend can be negative and time-varying, and moreover, that it
is negatively correlated with the positive and time-varying trend in economic growth.
This latter relationship describes an important channel by which the resource curse has
operated. For example, as industrial core growth rates rose during the 20th century,
the real commodity prices important to a primarily commodity-exporting periphery
fell dramatically, exacerbating the Great Divergence in economic growth rates between
the core and poorer periphery. Finally, we note that although long-run forecasts of
commodity prices can employ univariate time series models, they may therefore be
usefully improved by including forecasts of future economic growth.
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the extant
literature and the theory, section 3 the new data, whilst section 4 describes the empirical
methodology. The empirical results and associated discussion are presented in section
5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature and Theory
2.1 Long-run trends
As noted in the previous section, empirical research assessing the PS hypothesis pro-
vides mixed results. For example, assuming that logarithms of prices are represented
appropriately by a pure trend stationary process, Grilli and Yang (1988) find support
for the PS hypothesis, reporting a weighted aggregate real index decline of 0.6% per
annum from 1900-1986.5 On the other hand, Zanias (2005) employs the same Grilli-
Yang index extended to 1998, identifies two structural breaks (1920 and 1984) and
shows the 20th century decline in commodity prices is almost exclusively explained by
these shifts in the mean as opposed to any gradual trending effect. Moreover, empirical
results within the literature are often conditional on the assumed order of integration
of the relative price processes (see Kim et al., 2003) and whether structural breaks are
allowed in the underlying mean or trend function (see Harvey et al., 2010, and Yamada
and Yoon, 2014).
To provide more observations with which to estimate a possible trend, some papers
have taken a longer historical perspective. Addressing this issue, Cashin and McDer-
5The extant literature either employs aggregate or disaggregated data. For example, inter alios,
Sapsford (1985), Grilli and Yang (1988), Cuddington and Urzu´a (1989), Powell (1991), Ardeni and
Wright (1992), Sapsford et al. (1992), Reinhart and Wickham (1994) and Zanias (2005) examine trends
in aggregate commodity price indexes. However, Cuddington (1992), Leon and Soto (1997), Badillo
et al. (1999), Newbold et al. (2000), Kim et al. (2003), Kellard and Wohar (2006), Balagtas and Holt
(2009), Harvey et al. (2010) and Ghoshray (2011) examine trends in individual commodity prices.
Good summaries of this literature can be found in Greenaway and Morgan (1999) and Cuddington et
al. (2007).
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mott (2002) employ “the longest publicly available dataset”, the industrial commodity
price index of The Economist, covering the period 1862-1999. Their results suggest
a downward trend of 1.3% per annum in real commodity prices with no breaks in
the trend function. More recently, using their disaggregated dataset of 25 separate
commodities from 1650-2005, Harvey et al. (2010) circumvent any order of integra-
tion issues by applying test procedures for the presence of a single linear trend and
a broken trend which are robust to whether shocks are generated by an I(0) or I(1)
process. Interestingly, results show that five price series (Aluminum, Banana, Rice,
Sugar and Tea) present a significant and downward trend over all or some fraction of
the sample period. Of the remainder, nineteen reveal a zero trend (Beef, Coal, Cocoa,
Coffee, Copper, Cotton, Gold, Hide, Jute, Lamb, Lead, Nickel, Oil, Pig Iron, Silver,
Tin, Wheat, Wool and Zinc), whilst only Tobacco has a significant positive trend over
the full sample period.6 Finally, Arezki et al. (2014b) also employs the Harvey et al.
(2010) dataset but applies panel stationarity tests to assess integration order whilst
allowing for multiple structural breaks. The panel tests classify the series as stationary
and subsequently a linear trend model is fitted to individual price series before and af-
ter identified breaks. This piecewise regression suggests that the majority of segmented
trends are negative.
2.2 Theory
The theory of either long-run trend or cyclical movements about the trend are not well
developed or evidenced (see Deaton and Laroque, 2003). As noted in the introduction,
rationales for the trend include low income elasticities of demand for commodities,
technological and productivity differentials or asymmetric market structures between
the oligopolistic, manufacturing core and the competitive, commodity-producing south.
6The original Harvey et al. (2010) article indicated that eleven commodities presented a downward
trend, but the authors subsequently identified data construction errors arising from the incorrect
conversion of some US dollar prices to British pound sterling; the corrected results are given in
Harvey et al. (2012) and the corrected data set is available from the authors on request.
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Although there is a voluminous literature estimating the long-run trend properties of
relative commodity prices, given the difficulties in measuring possible causal factors
such as technological differentials, particularly over long-historical time spans, it is
therefore not surprising that there is very little work exploring any multivariate associ-
ation. However, a recent, partial equilibrium model is provided by Deaton and Laroque
(2003). Assume that:
yt = yt−1 + ε
y
t (1)
where yt represents the logarithm of world income. Using a standard log-linear demand
function, it can therefore be written:
dt = αyt − βpt + γ + εdt (2)
where dt is demand and pt is the world price for an internationally traded commodity.
Moreover, a supply function can be stated:
st = st−1 + δ(pt − p∗) + εst (3)
where st is current supply as a function of last period’s supply and the difference
between current price and some constant price p∗, which is the marginal cost of pro-
duction or extraction of the primary commodity. Assuming δ > 0, the supply function
embodies the ideas of Lewis (1954), that although the current price may remain above
p∗ for some time, eventually enough supply is forthcoming to adjust price downwards.
In particular, Lewis thought that the existence in some geographical areas of (almost)
infinite supplies of labour at the subsistence wage, meant that enough supply would be
generated to move prices to p∗ in the long-run. Deaton and Laroque (2003) show that
these three equations have some interesting implications. For example, after equalising
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supply and demand, it can be shown that:
∆st = (β + δ)
−1[δ(αyt−1 − st−1) + αδ∆yt + δγ − δβp∗ + δεdt + βεst ] (4)
and
pt − p∗ = (β + δ)−1[β(pt−1 − p∗) + α∆yt + ∆εdt − εst ] (5)
where (4) suggests that it is income and supply which are cointegrated7 and strikingly,
(5) implies that price is a zero-trend stationary process. Of course, we note that the
long-run price could instead be a slowly evolving or trending variable p∗t which is a
function of aforementioned variables like technology or market structure. Replacing
p∗with p∗t in (5) would also allow price to be a more general process and nest more of
the empirical evidence presented by the literature.
Providing a testable functional form for p∗t is difficult given the data limitations ex-
plained earlier. However, a useful proxy for the factors affecting p∗t might be the trend
growth rate of economic activity, y∗t . For example, inter alios, Sachs and McArthur
(2002) stress that technological innovation is a fundamental driver of long-run economic
growth. Moreover, increased market concentration can be seen as both a precursor to,
and a result of, technological change (see Lima, 2000). Certainly one could also argue
that relatively strong economic growth in the core over the majority of the 19th and
20th century has encouraged successful manufacturing firms to tend towards oligopoly
at an international level. Conversely, sources of primary commodity supply multiply,
partially in response to the structural adjustment policies adopted by indebted develop-
ing countries. Thus, this type of economic growth is likely to exert downward pressure
on relative commodity prices over the very long-run. A simple bivariate function might
be:
pt = κ+ λyt + ε
p
t (6)
7Deaton and Laroque (2003) find limited evidence for this claim but suggest that cointegration
tests lack power over their 20th century data set.
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where we expect λ < 0. Of course, any structural breaks in the trend of commodity
prices would also be correlated with breaks in trend income. We shall assess the
evidence for these conjectures in the later results section. However, we would first
posit that instead of examining indivdual commodity price series, an aggregate measure
would be more useful over the very long-run. Such measures will smooth idiosyncratic
effects and provide series more shaped by common factors that are therefore (i) easier
to identify from the economic history literature and (ii) potentially proxied by the
trend growth rate of income. The construction of such an aggregate index is discussed
in the next section.
3 Historical Exports and Aggregate Data
The often employed Grilli-Yang dataset comprises twenty-four, internationally traded,
non-fuel commodities.8 Each annual nominal commodity price series (in US dollars)
is deflated by the United Nations Manufacturers Unit Value (MUV) index, the MUV
series reflecting the unit values of manufacturing exports from a number of industrial
countries. Although a number of papers in the extant literature examine the twenty-
four commodities separately, many employ Grilli and Yang’s weighted aggregate real
index to summarise the behaviour of relative commodity prices as a whole.9
As noted in the introduction, the Grilli-Yang dataset begins in 1900, primarily be-
cause this is the starting date for the MUV series; however, commodity and manufac-
turing price data can be sampled backwards well before this time. Given the extensive
interest in modeling and analyzing the long-run trends of relative commodity prices, it
would appear important to utilize as much of the existing data as is sensibly possible.
To do this, Harvey et al. (2010) created a large and representative dataset of twenty-five
8The commodities are Aluminum, Banana, Beef, Cocoa, Coffee, Copper, Cotton, Hide, Jute, Lamb,
Lead, Maize, Palm Oil, Rice, Rubber, Silver, Sugar, Tea, Timber, Tin, Tobacco, Wheat, Wool and
Zinc.
9The 1977-1979 values of world exports of each commodity are used as weights.
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relative commodity price series10 (nominal prices in British pound sterling11) covering
a 356 year period from 1650 to 2005.12 However, as a result of employing all available
data, the series are of unequal lengths. Specifically, twelve series begin in the 17th
century (Beef, Coal, Cotton, Gold, Lamb, Lead, Rice, Silver, Sugar, Tea, Wheat and
Wool), three series begin in the 18th century (Coffee, Tobacco and Pig Iron), eight
series begin in the 19th century (Aluminum, Cocoa, Copper, Hide, Nickel, Oil, Tin
and Zinc) and two start from 1900 (Banana and Jute). Twenty of these commodities
are also found in the Grilli-Yang dataset and twenty-three are non-fuel. Each nomi-
nal commodity price was deflated by a historical price index of manufactures (HPIM),
stretching back to 1650.13
Harvey et al. (2010) assess the properties of the twenty-five ultra-long commodity
prices separately. However, given the tendency in the literature to also examine ag-
gregate commodity series, it would appear useful to construct an ultra-long aggregate
series. Of course, this is not a trivial task, in particular because prices and weights se-
ries for all commodities are not available uniformly over the period 1650 to the present
day. Let the Commodity Composite Price Index (CCPI) be the weighted average of
twenty-three Harvey et al. (2010) commodities, where the weights reflect the impor-
tance of each commodity in total commodity trade.14 When constructing the CCPI,
the following steps have been followed. First, the commodity price index (CPI) is
calculated using
∑N
i=1witpit, where wit and pit respectively represent the weight and
price of the ith commodity in a particular year t. If prices and weights are available
10See the appendix of Harvey et al. (2010) for a fuller description of the source of each price.
11British pound sterling is used because the US did not have its own currency before independence
in 1776.
12Although it is possible to get data for commodity prices from before 1650, we could find no reliable
source of manufacturing prices.
13For details on the construction of HPIM see Harvey et al. (2010).
14In this paper, we employ the extended Harvey et al. (2010) commodity and manufacturing price
dataset that runs from 1650 to 2010. Additionally, we removed gold and silver from the original list of
twenty-five commodities. There is no clear distinction between monetary gold/silver and commodity
gold/silver imports in the US Geological Survey data; this could create a distortion, as, for example,
monetary gold and silver were heavily imported during the two world-war eras.
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for N − 1 commodities in the first t = 1, ..., x years and then for N commodities in the
next t = x + 1, ..., y years, individual CPI series are first constructed for each period
t = 1, ..., x+1 and t = x+1, ..., y using data on N−1 and N commodities, respectively.
Next, denote by wN−1i,x+1 and w
N
i,x+1 the weights employed in these two schemes for the
overlapping year t = x+ 1. Then, using the ratio
∑N
i=1w
N
i,x+1pi,x+1/
∑N−1
i=1 w
N−1
i,x+1pi,x+1,
the aggregate series is created by multiplying the ratio by the individual CPI values
for the t = 1, ..., x period and splicing the individual series together to assemble the
CCPI.
Several benchmark years, namely 1830, 1860, 1900, 1912, 1928, 1937, 1950, 1975
and 2006 are used to calculate the weights of commodities. Specifically, exports of
commodities from the commodity-dependent price-taking economies (the periphery15)
are used as weights.16 To be clear, the export value of the ith commodity is divided
by the total export value of all selected N commodities in year t to get the weight,
wit, of the ith commodity in year t. The periphery consists of Asia (excluding Russia),
Africa and South America. The benchmark dates are predominantly dictated by data
availability; in particular, data on commodity exports are not available before 1830
on a world scale and it is doubtful that the scant import data that are available for a
couple of industrialized countries before 1830 are representative of commodity exports
for the periphery. In terms of composition of traded commodities there has been a
marked change over time. Sugar, textile fibres, coffee, tea and cocoa were the main
export items in 1830 and came predominantly from Asia and South America. Of course,
energy and metals have recently become the dominant commodities in world trade.
The benchmark years are subsequently linearly interpolated to get weighted series
for each commodity on an annual basis. Specifically, interpolation is applied between
15Blattman et al. (2007) adopts the distinction between the periphery and the core (industrial
leaders).
16The primary source for the weights to 1937 is ‘Commodity Structure of Third World Exports 1830-
1937’ by Paul Bairoch and Bouda Etemad. The sources for subsequent weights are UN International
Trade Statistics Yearbooks and the UNCTADstat Commodity Trade Matrix. For more details and a
full list of sources, see the Data Appendix.
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the benchmark years from 1830 to 2006; to complete the series, 1830 weights are used
before 1830 and 2006 weights are used after 2006. Although weights before 1830 are
kept constant due to unavailability of data, the weights of commodities have been
calculated such that their sum remains 100 in each year. For years where price data
is unavailable for a few commodities, weights for those commodities in those years are
set to zero under the assumption that a commodity has no value or weight when the
price is zero. This leads to the construction of the CCPI covering a 361 year period
from 1650 to 2010.
Finally, note that another comparator index was also created, a non-oil version of
the Commodity Composite Price Index (CCPI′). Figure 1 shows the logarithms of
CCPI and CCPI′, revealing a close similarity and apparent downward trend in both
series over the full sample period. CCPI and CCPI′ will be empirically examined
over the full sample; the unbroken trend analysis is applied to a sub-sample of these
series (1900-2008), allowing for a more direct comparison with an updated version of
the Grilli-Yang non-fuel weighted aggregate real index (GYCPI).17 Figure 2 plots the
logarithms of these indices over 1900 to 2008. Notably (and as might be expected),
the logarithms of CCPI, CCPI′ and GYCPI appear to move in a relatively consistent
manner over the course of the 20th century. Of course, differences will arise, even
between these similar series. For example, while CCPI and CCPI′ are constructed using
variable weights and the HPIM deflator, GYCPI uses constant weights from 1977-79
and the MUV deflator. In particular, Figure 3 illustrates how HPIM compares with
the MUV index for the period since 1900, over which the MUV index is available. In
absolute terms the difference is not large and thus is reflected in a very high correlation
coefficient of 0.993. However, and as can be observed in Figure 3, in relative terms there
are a few significant differences, most notably during the period 1914-1945, where the
MUV index is often 25% below our index. As noted by Harvey et al. (2010), this result
17The authors thank Stephan Pfaffenzeller for providing the extended GYCPI series from 1900 to
2008.
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suggests that export unit values used to construct the MUV index are potentially biased
measures of price movements, particularly when long data series are considered.18
4 Empirical methodology
4.1 Testing for a linear trend
We initially consider the following data generating process (DGP) for pt, the logarithm
of relative commodity prices:
pt = α + βt+ ut, t = 1, ..., T (7)
ut = ρut−1 + εt, t = 2, ..., T (8)
with u1 = ε1, where εt is assumed to follow a stationary process. To permit the errors
ut to be either I(0) or I(1), we assume −1 < ρ ≤ 1, with the cases |ρ| < 1 and ρ = 1
corresponding to I(0) and I(1) errors, respectively. Given that we are interested in
examining the PSH, the null hypothesis to be tested is H0 : β = 0, and we wish to
conduct tests on this hypothesis without assuming knowledge of whether the errors ut
are stationary or contain a unit root.
In the context of such a DGP, Perron and Yabu (2009a) propose a test of H0 : β = 0
that is robust to the order of integration properties of the underlying errors ut. Their
strategy is based on quasi-feasible GLS estimation of (7)-(8), i.e. a test based on βˆQF ,
the OLS estimator of β in the regression:
pt − ρ˜MSpt−1 = (1− ρ˜MS)α + β[t− ρ˜MS(t− 1)] + (ut − ρ˜MSut−1), t = 2, ..., T (9)
together with y1 = α + β + u1. Here, ρ˜MS is an estimator of ρ designed to be super-
18Harvey et al. (2010) suggest the value-added price deflator used by HPIM has three advantages
over export unit values: first, it omits the influence of intermediate products; second, it allows for
compositional changes; and third, technological progress is, to some extent, reflected in the deflator.
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efficient when ρ = 1. It is obtained by first constructing a bias-corrected estimator
of ρ using the truncated weighted symmetric least squares method of Roy and Fuller
(2001); Perron and Yabu consider two such estimators derived under different trun-
cation settings (see their paper for full details), which we denote by ρ˜MU and ρ˜UB.
This bias-corrected estimate is then assigned a value of 1 when it lies within a T−1/2
neighbourhood of 1, generating the estimator ρ˜MS, i.e.:
ρ˜MS =
 ρ˜M if |ρ˜M − 1| > T
−1/2
1 if |ρ˜M − 1| ≤ T−1/2
where ρ˜M denotes either ρ˜MU or ρ˜UB. Finally, the robust trend test statistic is given
by:
tRQFβ =
βˆQF√
hˆε(X ′X)−122
where (X ′X)−122 denotes the (2, 2) element of (X
′X)−1 with X = [x1, ..., xT ]′, x′t =
[1 − ρ˜MS, t − ρ˜MS(t − 1)] for t = 2, ..., T and x′1 = [1, 1], and where hˆε denotes the
long-run variance estimator detailed in section 3 of Perron and Yabu (2009a), the
exact form of which depends on whether ρ˜MS = ρ˜M or ρ˜MS = 1. We denote the two
alternative versions by tRQFβ (MU ) and t
RQF
β (UB), according to which of ρ˜MU and ρ˜UB
is used. Perron and Yabu show that these statistics both follow an asymptotic standard
normal distribution under the null H0 : β = 0.
4.2 Testing for breaks in trend
The extant literature has shown that relative commodity prices may not be optimally
represented by a single, secular trend but by some segmented alternative (see, inter
alia, Ghoshray, 2011, and Kellard and Wohar, 2006). When assessing the evidence
for a broken trend, this literature has typically, as in the unbroken trend context,
relied on procedures that require pre-testing for a unit root. To circumvent the issues
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surrounding the identification of the order of integration, and to examine directly
whether commodity prices contain a break in trend, Harvey et al. (2010) employ the
Harvey et al. (2009) test for a single break in trend, which does not assume any
a priori knowledge as to the order of integration of series. Analogously, Perron and
Yabu (2009b) provide a robust test for a single trend break that adopts the same broad
approach as the Perron and Yabu (2009a) test for a linear trend.
Of course, it is quite possible that commodity price series contain more than one
structural break, particularly given the long historical time series under consideration
in this chapter, thus we next consider testing for the presence of multiple breaks in
trend. We therefore augment the deterministic component of the DGP to allow for, say,
m breaks in level/trend, i.e. we consider replacing (7) with the following specification:
pt = α + βt+
m∑
j=1
δjDUjt(T
B
j ) +
m∑
j=1
γjDTjt(T
B
j ) + ut, t = 1, ..., T (10)
where DUjt(T
B
j ) = 1(t > T
B
j ) and DTjt(T
B
j ) = 1(t > T
B
j )(t − TBj ), j = 1, ...,m, with
1(.) denoting the indicator function and TBj , j = 1, ...,m, denoting the break dates.
In this framework, Kejriwal and Perron (2010) propose a methodology for deter-
mining the number of breaks in trend, robust to the order of integration of the errors
ut, based on a sequential application of the Perron and Yabu (2009b) procedure for de-
tecting a single break in trend. The first step is to apply the Perron and Yabu (2009b)
test directly to the series, testing the null of no breaks against the alternative of one
break in level/trend. As in the linear trend testing context, the Perron-Yabu approach
involves a test based on quasi-feasible GLS estimation, i.e. the regression:
pt − ρ˜MSpt−1 = (1− ρ˜MS)α + β[t− ρ˜MS(t− 1)] + δ1[DU1t(TB1 )− ρ˜MSDU1,t−1(TB1 )]
+ γ1[DT1t(T
B
1 )− ρ˜MSDT1,t−1(TB1 )] + (ut − ρ˜MSut−1), t = 2, ..., T
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together with y1 = α + β + u1. As before, ρ˜MS is given by:
ρ˜MS =
 ρ˜M if |ρ˜M − 1| > T
−1/2
1 if |ρ˜M − 1| ≤ T−1/2
(11)
now with ρ˜M a bias-corrected estimator of ρ based on an OLS Dickey-Fuller regression
(allowing for a constant, trend and break in level/trend) and the subsequent correction
of Roy and Fuller (2001) (see Perron and Yabu, 2009b, for full details). For a known
break date TB1 , the test statistic is an autocorrelation-corrected Wald-type statistic for
testing H0 : δ1 = γ1 = 0, the precise form of which depends on whether ρ˜MS = ρ˜M or
ρ˜MS = 1 (see their paper for details); we denote this statistic by W RQF (T
B
1 ). However,
given that the timing of any potential break is treated as unknown, the final Perron-
Yabu statistic is obtained by taking the following functional of the Wald-type statistics
across all candidate break dates:
Exp-W = log{T−1∑TB1 ∈[bpiT c,b(1−pi)T c] exp[12W RQF (TB1 )]} (12)
where b.c denotes the integer part of the argument, and the fraction 0 < pi < 1
represents a trimming parameter (set to 0.10 in this chapter) excluding breaks at the
very beginning or end of the sample. Although the limit null distribution of Exp-W
differs under I(0) and I(1) errors, Perron and Yabu (2009b) show that the critical values
are not dissimilar at typical levels of significance, and recommend using the maximum
of the I(0) and I(1) critical values to ensure the resulting test is conservative.19
If the null of zero breaks in level/trend is not rejected, the Kejriwal and Perron
procedure terminates. Otherwise, the next step is to condition on there being at least
one break, and proceed to examine evidence for more than one break. The sequential
19Note that in the I(1) case, normality of the innovations is assumed when obtaining the null limit
distribution, due to the fact that the level change dummy variable in the GLS regression becomes an
outlier when ρ˜MS = 1.
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procedure continues according to the following steps, beginning with l = 1:
1. Conditional on l break(s) having been detected, estimate the timing of the
break(s) TB1 , ..., T
B
l by minimising the global sum of squared residuals (SSR)
obtained from OLS estimation of (10) across all candidate break points, i.e.:
TˆB1 , ..., Tˆ
B
l = arg min
TB1 ,...,T
B
l ∈[bpiT c,b(1−pi)T c]
T∑
t=1
uˆ2t (T
B
1 , ..., T
B
l ) (13)
with uˆt(T
B
1 , ..., T
B
l ) denoting the residuals in the OLS estimated equation:
pt = αˆ + βˆt+
l∑
j=1
δˆjDUjt(T
B
j ) +
l∑
j=1
γˆjDTjt(T
B
j ) + uˆt(T
B
1 , ..., T
B
l ), t = 1, ..., T.
(14)
2. Split the sample into l + 1 segments according to the estimated break dates
TˆB1 , ..., Tˆ
B
l . Compute the Exp-W test statistic (12) for a single break in trend for
each of the l + 1 segments, denoting the resulting statistics Exp-W 1, ...,Exp-W l.
3. Test the null of l break(s) against the alternative of l + 1 breaks using the test
statistic
FT (l + 1 |l ) = max{Exp-W 1, ...,Exp-W l} (15)
compared with critical values provided by Kejriwal and Perron. As with the
Perron and Yabu (2009b) statistic, the limit critical values depend on whether
the errors are I(0) or I(1) (but are quite close) and the maximum of the two
critical values is used.
4. If no rejection is obtained, terminate the procedure with the inference that l
break(s) are present. If the null of l break(s) is rejected, increase l by 1 and
repeat from step 1.
Although in principle this sequential procedure can continue until termination
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where no further breaks are detected, in practice Kejriwal and Perron caution against
allowing too many breaks in finite samples, given the potential for size distortions and
low power that can arise in the small sub-samples involved in the procedure. In our
commodity price application, we set the maximal number of breaks to be three.
5 Empirical results and discussion
5.1 Commodity price trend function analysis
Table 1 shows the results of applying the order of integration robust trend testtRQFβ (MU )
presented in section 4.1 to the new relative commodity price indices outlined in section
3.20 The table also reports estimated growth rates and confidence intervals based on
the quasi-feasible GLS approach of Perron and Yabu (2009a), i.e. from estimation of
(9). Notably, for both new series CCPI and CCPI′ over the full sample, the null of
no trend is rejected in favour of the alternative of a negative trend at the 1% signifi-
cance level. This is a striking result, particularly when considering the sample length
of the new commodity indices. The two series, commencing in 1650, have declined
subsequently at an annual average rate of approximately 0.9%.
On the other hand, although the three sub-sample series also display negative
growth rates, only the test statistic for the GYCPI series is large enough to reject
the null from 1900 onwards. The inability of the CCPI and CCPI′ series to generate
rejections of the null of no trend is perhaps reflective of their relatively larger variance
over the course of the 20th century, compared with the GYCPI data. Note that testing
against a two-sided alternative (allowing for the possibility of positive trends) does not
lead to any further rejections of the no trend null.
Focusing now on the two ultra-long series (CCPI and CCPI′), it is important to
20The tRQFβ (UB) test gives analogous results and is therefore not reported. Additionally, the zλ
test of Harvey et al. (2007) also gives similar results that are available on request from the authors.
19
next consider the possibility that one or more structural breaks have occurred in the
deterministic trend function, as discussed in section 2.2. Table 2 reports results for
the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) sequential order of integration robust procedure for
detecting the number of breaks in level/trend, up to the maximum number permitted
of three. For each step of the sequential procedure, the table reports results for the
FT (l + 1 |l ) test of (15), and, if a rejection is obtained in favour of l + 1 break(s), the
estimated break date(s) obtained at each stage using (13) are also reported. The end
result of the procedure is a finding of evidence (at the 1% significance level) in favour
of three breaks in level/trend for both CCPI and CCPI′. The breaks occur at the dates
1820, 1872/3 and 1946, with the corresponding fitted values at these minimum global
SSR dates, i.e. the fitted values from (14), given by:
CCPI: pt = 2.88− 0.0079t
+ 0.34DU1t(1820) + 0.0031DT1t(1820)
− 0.37DU2t(1872)− 0.0087DT2t(1872)
+ 0.49DU3t(1946)− 0.0049DT3t(1946) + uˆt
CCPI′: pt = 2.88− 0.0079t
+ 0.34DU1t(1820) + 0.0027DT1t(1820)
− 0.39DU2t(1873)− 0.0074DT2t(1873)
+ 0.68DU3t(1946)− 0.0059DT3t(1946) + uˆt
Graphical representations of these results are given in Figures 4 and 5.
The two commodity price indices can therefore be approximately split into four
intertemporal regimes: 1650 to the early 1820s; the early 1820s to the early 1870s;
the early 1870s to the mid-1940s; and the mid-1940s to the present day. To ascertain
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whether the trends in each of these four regimes are significantly negative, we wish to
test the following hypotheses (based on the model (10)): H0 : β = 0 for the first regime
(1650-1820), H0 : β+γ1 = 0 for the second regime (1821-1872/3), H0 : β+γ1+γ2 = 0 for
the third regime (1873/4-1946), and H0 : β+γ1+γ2+γ3 = 0 for the fourth regime (1947-
2010), in each case against a one-sided (lower-tailed) alternative. In order to conduct
tests of these hypotheses that are again robust to the order of integration of the errors,
we consider a quasi-feasible GLS-based testing approach consistent with the Perron and
Yabu (2009b) approach for testing for a break. Specifically, conditioning on the three
dates determined by the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) procedure, we use autocorrelation-
corrected t-tests based on quasi-feasible GLS estimation of (10), with quasi-difference
parameter ρ˜MS as defined in (11), but with ρ˜M now a bias-corrected estimator of ρ
based on an OLS Dickey-Fuller regression that allows for a constant, trend and the
three breaks in level/trend. The resulting autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are
then formed in an analogous way to W RQF (T
B
1 ) of Perron and Yabu (2009b), and,
conditional on the break dates, follow asymptotic standard normal distributions under
the respective null hypotheses. Table 3 reports the results, and we find strong evidence
in favour of a declining trend in all regimes for CCPI′, and for CCPI, all regimes apart
from 1821-1872, where the trend estimate is negative but found to be insignificantly
different from zero.
The vast majority of work has examined the PS hypothesis over the post-1900
period but we can now additionally comment on its relevance prior to the 20th century.
Strikingly, our results confirm that relative commodity prices present a significant and
downward global trend over almost the entire sample period. With the exception of
the 1821-1872 period, the growth rates of the commodity price indices were found to
decline in the ranges −0.79% to −1.83% per annum for CCPI, and −0.79% to −1.84%
per annum for CCPI′, over the different regimes. It is noticeable that the broadly
declining trend paths of the price series are punctuated by structural breaks in the
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level and trend; 1820 shows a sharp rise in the level and trend, 1872/3 sees a sharp fall
in level and trend, while 1946 shows a rise in level but further decline in trend21. This
identification of changing trend behaviour provides new characterisations of historical
price behaviour – for example, the 19th century terms of trade boom is captured by a
local increase in prices during the second regime (i.e. early 1820s to the early 1870s),
superimposed on a generic long-run downward trend. Moreover, the results suggest
that the decline in trend has been greater since the early 1870s than at any time
previous (albeit offset to some extent by an upward level shift in 1946). The causes
behind the modern incarnation of the PS hypothesis therefore appear arguably stronger
than those that existed in the more distant past – we shall return to this later.
5.2 Economic history and time series analysis
Earlier in the chapter, we suggested that the time series characteristics of aggregate
commodity series might be usefully cross-referenced with the extant economic history
literature to provide futher insights into the causal underpinnings of long-run price
movements. Considering first the 17th and 18th centuries, our results show the growth
rate of the commodity price indices declining significantly between 1650 and the early
1800s at approximately 0.79% per annum. It is important to note that traded goods
for the three centuries (i.e., 16th, 17th, 18th) following the exploratory voyages of
Columbus (1451-1506) and da Gama (1460/1469-1524) were typically non-competing,
high priced luxury goods (i.e., spices, sugar and gold), worth transporting over large
distances at high cost (see O’Rourke and Williamson, 2002 and 2004). Subsequently,
trade in the 19th and 20th century is characterised by increasingly lower priced goods.
The trade boom (from the early 1500s to late 1700s) was therefore driven by discovery
and growing demand in Europe; however, prices were supported by duties, monopolies
and the high cost of sea transportation (including piracy) which did not begin to fall
21Sumner (2009) notes that agricultural commodity prices rose sharply through World War II to
post-war spikes.
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until the 19th century (see O’Rourke and Williamson, 2002).
Perhaps the most important traded commodity in the 17th and 18th centuries was
sugar. The great naval powers of the time (i.e. Spain, Portugal and Britain) imported
sugar from West Indian and South American colonies, devoting enormous resources
to protecting the trade.22 European consumption grew astonishingly; for example,
from 1663 to 1775, consumption in England and Wales increased twenty fold (Robbins,
1999). As the demand for sugar grew, supply was encouraged, and although the price
was supported by the factors discussed above, prices fell and sugar consumption became
no longer the preserve of the upper classes (see Robbins, 1999). Given the dominant
role of sugar in the commodity indices prior to the 19th century, it is plausible to view
the gradual decline of the indices as reflecting that of sugar until the occurrence of the
commodity supply disruptions brought about by the combined efforts of the American
War of Independence, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars from 1776-1812
(see O’Rourke, 2006).
Moving on, our results in the previous subsection show a relative boom in rel-
ative commodity prices between the early 1820s and the early 1870s. Analogously,
Williamson (2008) posits that a terms of trade boom for commodity exporting countries
occurred during the 19th century and encouraged primary commodity specialisation
in the poor periphery. The boom itself can perhaps be attributed to three primary
factors noted by Williamson (2008): growing GDP in the industrialising European
core, liberalisation of trade, and the rapid fall in transport costs via sea (see Jacks and
Pendakur, 2010) and rail routes. In particular, the relative technology improvements
in manufacturing compared to other economic activities (see Clark et al., 2008), occur-
ring while demand in the core for commodities rose, produced upward pressure on the
periphery terms of trade. The resulting specialisation is hypothesised by Williamson
22It should not go without comment that the sugar trade was a major factor in the expansion of the
Atlantic slave trade. As Robbins (1999, p.216) notes, “From 1701 to 1810 almost one million slaves
were brought to Barbados and Jamaica to work on the sugar plantations”.
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(2008) to have caused deindustrialisation23 via the twin mechanisms of high commodity
price levels and the associated volatility24, and ultimately the Great Divergence, as the
income gap between the industrial core and poor periphery widened.
Earlier seminal work by Lewis (1978a, 1978b) proposed the causal factors for the
Great Divergence operated primarily between 1870 and 1913. In contrast, Williamson
(2008) suggests the relevant period can be dated before and up to 1870. Our results
provide new statistical evidence for the latter claim. Given relative commodity prices
are an appropriate proxy for periphery terms of trade, the early 1820s to the early 1870s
period is clearly a hiatus in the falling terms of trade experienced in the centuries before.
Indeed, Figure 1 shows a long boom from around 1820 to the mid-1840s and a local peak
during the mid-1860s. If any period could incentivise commodity price specialisation
and resulting deindustrialisation, it seems plausible to suggest the globalisation phase
in the 19th century prior to 1870.
Our statistical work shows that after 1870, the trend in relative commodity prices
fell at a faster rate than before 1800. In part, this is because the technological differen-
tial between manufacturing and primary commodity production narrows over the 20th
century. Additionally, the continued and rising economic growth in the industrialising
core (despite two world wars) drove the formation of large oligopolistic manufacturing
firms at a global scale. However, the deindustrialisation or non-industrialisation in
primary commodity producing nations, has resulted in relatively small, homogeneous
producers compensating workers with low wages. It is perhaps the joint application of
these forces - technological differentials, larger oligopolistic manufacturing firms, non-
23We suggest an appropriate term in some country cases might be “non-industrialisation”.
24Recent research has established a link between commodity price volatility, lower growth and
disincentives to invest in countries with economies dominated by natural resource production (see,
inter alia, Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2009). Additionally, as Jacks et al. (2009, p.5) note, “...while
greater volatility increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic consumption,
Cata˜o and Kapur (2004) have shown recently that volatility constrained the ability to borrow between
1970 and 2001. It seems likely that the same was true between 1870 and 1901, a century earlier, and
even more so before 1870 when a global capital market was only just emerging (Obstfeld and Taylor
2004; Mauro et al. 2006)”.
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industrialisation of the periphery, low wages and continued poverty in the periphery,
that have caused such downward pressure on relative commodity prices over the course
of the 20th century.
Finally, it should be noted that although our time series analysis indicates a signif-
cant, downward trend over several centuries, at the end of our sample period we faced a
relative upturn in commodity prices in the early 21st century. Are there parallels in the
past to inform the future behaviour of these prices? One might suggest that the 19th
century boom is perhaps analogous to the situation in the early 21st century, as China,
India and other emerging nations industrialise, demand more primary commodities
and increase their relative price. Assuming the underlying drivers of modernisation in
the developing world are likely to remain in place, the 19th century experience shows
that real commodity prices can remain above trend for many years before reverting to
secular decline. Given recent falls in nominal commodity prices during 2014, we are
perhaps witnessing some reversion currently.
5.3 GDP trend function analysis
In section 2, it was suggested that a useful proxy for the factors affecting the trend
in relative commodity prices might be the trend growth rate of economic activity. In
particular, we conjectured that common trend breaks in commodity prices and relevant
GDP series would provide some evidence for this idea. Therefore, to investigate and for
consistency, we apply the same trend tests (here against a positive trend alternative)
and trend break tests to historical GDP series for the UK, World and China.
The UK became the world’s pre-eminent economy over the course of the 17th to
19th century and by the early 1800s had the highest per capita income in the world
(see Bolt and Van Zenden, 2013). We initially source our income data, similarly to
Erten and Ocampo (2013), from Angus Maddison’s data, updated recently by the
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Maddison Project.25 However, this annual data for UK GDP only goes back to 1800.
Recently, Broadberry et al. (2011) produced a real output series for the UK from 1270
to 1870. It is this data from 1650 that is plotted in Figure 6 and the results of the
trend and trend break tests shown in the top sections of Tables 4 and 5 respectively.26
Interestingly, UK GDP shows a significant and positive trend growth rate of 1.28% per
annum over the sample period, helping to explain the increasing demand for luxury
goods like sugar and providing the downward pressure on real commodity prices until
the early 19th century. Moreover, a positive break in the trend in 1817, capturing
the UK’s rising industrial production, technological advances in manufacturing and
growth, closely matches the first break found in our CCPI series and the terms of trade
boom for the periphery dated in the previous section.
The US overtook the UK in terms of GDP in the 1870s (see Broadberry and Klein,
2011) and the rest of the industrial core also grew strongly over much of the 19th
and 20th century. This is reflected in the growth of World GDP27 plotted in Figure
7 for 1820-2009. Table 4 shows the trend presents a growth rate of 2.23% per annum
whilst Table 5 shows breaks of a positive sign occur in the trend during the 1870s
and 1950s.28 Again, these breaks closely match those identified for earlier CCPI series.
Overall, it would appear that since the 1870s, increasing rates of trend economic growth
in World GDP are associated with declining trend rates in relative commodity prices.
This provides further support for the idea that some of the characteristics of industrial
core growth (e.g., the tendency to oligopoly) coupled with the over-specialisation of
periphery nations into primary commodity exports, led to declining commodity prices,
inhibiting periphery growth and enhancing the Great Divergence.
25See http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm
26Given the shorter sample period available for the UK GDP series, we set the maximal number of
breaks to two.
27The source for this data is also the Maddison Project. Similarly to Erten and Ocampo (2013) we
use the annual GDP series for the World with complete data from 1950 onwards and discrete values
for 1820, 1870, 1913 and 1940. The missing values are interpolated using data for 16 OECD countries
from 1870, and the 7 available OECD countries from 1820.
28As for the UK GDP series, here we set the maximal number of breaks to two.
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In any case, it is useful to estimate (6) to get a sense of the association between
economic activity and relative commodity prices. Assuming (6) represents some very
long-run stable (e.g. cointegrating) relationship, we can estimate the following regres-
sion using FM-OLS for 1650-2009:29
pt = 4.28− 0.430yt + uˆt (16)
where pt denotes the logarithms of CCPI
′ (results for CCPI were very similar). Notably,
tests of cointegration including Phillips-Ouliaris (τ statistic is −4.01 with a p-value of
0.008) and Engle-Granger (τ statistic is −4.16 with a p-value of 0.005) reject the null
of no-cointegration30. Given our estimate of λ is −0.430, this implies that for every one
percent increase in economic activity, there is a 0.43 percent decline in long-run relative
commodity prices. Figure 8 represents this graphically, showing the actual and fitted
values from (16). In particular, the post-1870s period has clearly not been a supportive
or even benign period for commodity-dependent developing countries. Work such as
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001) and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) provide
evidence documenting the negative relationship between commodity dependence and
economic growth - the so-called resource curse. Our analysis, showing a strong negative
relationship between long-run relative commodity prices and long-run economic growth
provides further evidence to support this notion and suggests that falling prices and
their attendant wealth effects, have been an important channel by which the resource
curse has operated.
Of course, since the mid-1990s and over most of the first decade of the 21st century,
commodity prices rose (see Figures 1 and 2). Academics (see, for example, Cuddington
and Jerrett, 2008) and commentators alike asked whether prices were in a positive
29To create a commodity-relevant economic activity series from 1650 we combine the real UK GDP
series from Broadberry et al. (2011) from 1650-1870 with the Maddison World GDP data 1870-2009,
using the common year 1870 to convert the data into a unified series.
30Erten and Ocampo (2013) also showed that economic activity and commodity prices are cointe-
grated.
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growth phase of a super-cycle; a medium-length cyclical movement with a periodicty
between 20 and 40 years. As we noted in the previous section, explanations for higher
prices include the rapid economic growth delivered by China and other modernising
developing economies. Figure 9 plots the available Maddison GDP data for China
from 1950 and Tables 4 and 5 show the trend and trend break tests.31 Interestingly,
China’s path of trend growth broke positively around the late 1970s and has since shown
particularly high growth rates of 7.5% per annum. If this continued, real commodity
prices could remain supported above trend (similar to the mid-19th century) for a
number of years. However, as noted in the previous sub-section, recent price falls
occurred during 2014 and are associated with falling oil prices and concerns around
the future economic growth of countries like China. To assess the length of any possible
cycle, we next apply a recent filtering procedure to the aggregate commodity prices
series over the full sample (1650-2010) and some relevant sub-samples.
5.4 Analysis of cyclical components
Recent work such as Erten and Ocampo (2013), Harvey et al. (2010) and Cuddington
and Jerrett (2008) have employed the asymmetric band pass filter of Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2003) to partition commodity price series into three components:
pt = Tt + LCt + SCt, t = 1, ..., T
where Tt is a trend component, LCt is a long-term cyclical component and SCt a
short-term cyclical component. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) introduce a filter
that develops the band pass approach of Baxter and King (1999) and allows the three
cyclical components to be computed without trimming the end-points of the data
sample. The filter can be implemented whether the time series presents a unit root or
31As the China series only contains 61 observations, we set the maximal number of breaks in this
series to one.
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is stationary (around a deterministic component).
Following Cuddington and Jerrett (2008), the trend is defined as all cyclical com-
ponents lasting 70 years or longer. Long-term cycles are then defined as lasting from
20-70 years and short-term cycles as ranging from 2-20 years. Denoting by CF (c1, c2)
the asymmetric band pass filter that passes cycles between c1 and c2 in length, we can
define Tt, LCt and SCt as follows:
Tt = CF (70,∞)
LCt = CF (20, 70)
SCt = CF (2, 20).
The initial step of the Christiano and Fitzgerald filter is to de-trend the data under the
assumption that a unit root is present in the data. In an unbroken trend framework,
the estimate of β in (7)-(8) is therefore obtained by OLS estimation with ρ set to 1,
i.e. OLS estimation of the first differenced regression ∆yt = β + εt. If breaks in the
trend function are detected, this initial step can be modified by including the breaks
in the deterministic component used for the de-trending, now estimating the relevant
coefficients using a first differenced version of (10).
Table 6 provides summary measures of the cyclical components. The sub-samples
considered are primarily based around the estimated break dates identified in the ear-
lier part of the empirical results, while also ensuring that each sub-sample is of a
suitable length for estimating long-term cycles; specifically, we consider 1650-1872/3
and 1872/3-2010. Additionally, the period 1900-2010 is examined, given that a starting
value of 1900 is consonant with the common initial date used in the extant literature.
The deterministic component used to de-trend the data in each sample employs the
estimated break dates identified in section 4.2. A graphical representation of the full
sample cyclical components is given in Figures 10 and 11.
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Column 2 of Table 6 shows the standard deviation of the long-term cyclical compo-
nent LCt, and column 4 shows the ratio of the standard deviations of LCt and the total
non-trend cyclical component SCt+LCt. The range of this ratio extends from 0.709 to
0.895 and, analogously to Harvey et al. (2010), indicates the primacy of the long-term
component in cyclical commodity price movements. The mean periodicity of the LCt
cycles (see column 5) ranges from 26.571 years to 31.500 years and appears to get longer
as the sample moves into the 20th century. This increasing periodicity, accompanied
by an increasing standard deviation, is further suggestive of the increasing amplitude
that can be observed in Figures 10 and 11. Clearly, if long-term cycles are increasing
both in amplitude and duration, policy initiatives to directly smooth commodity prices
or producer or consumer incomes around a trend will require economic planning over
increasingly long time horizons.
Conversely, the mean periodicity of the SCt cycles (see column 6) ranges from
3.815 years to 4.255 years and appears to get shorter as the sample moves into and
through the 20th century. Indeed, although we consider the 1947-2010 period to be
too short to reliably estimate long-term cycles, we additionally computed estimates of
the short-run cyclical components over this most recent sub-sample; interestingly, the
mean periodicity of the SCt cycles falls further to 3.529 years and 3.867 years for CCPI
and CCPI′, respectively. This is suggestive of increasing commodity price volatility,
analogous to the results of Cashin and McDermott (2002), but placed in the context
of a much longer time period. Given the literature has established an empirical link
between volatility and growth, the observed increase in volatility is likely to have been
damaging to investment and growth in poorer commodity-dependent countries.
Finally, even with super-cycles lasting around 31 years, from our prior analysis
the lesson of the past four centuries appears to be that a negative trend in relative
commodity prices eventually re-asserts itself. When forecasting over the long-run and
deciding on whether to treat commodity-export income as permanent or temporary,
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policy makers should bear this uppermost in mind.
6 Conclusions
Many developing countries present export earnings that are primary commodity de-
pendent. Therefore, the presence of a secular decline in primary commodity relative
prices as implied by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, suggests that unless developing
countries diversify into manufactures and/or services, they will incur long-run economic
stagnation. However, as Deaton and Laroque (2003) note, despite a large literature
attempting the estimation of a trend, our understanding of any causes of the long-run
path in relative commodity prices is relatively limited. In particular, any causal investi-
gation of the trend is hampered by the lack of historical data on possible factors such as
income elasticities of demand, technological and productivity differentials, and relative
market power measures between the core (industrial) and periphery (non-industrial
and commodity exporting) countries. We suggest a threefold approach to circumvent
the lack of data.
First, we argue that aggregating relative commodity prices over the very long-
run can smooth idiosyncratic effects and provide summary series shaped primarily by
common factors. To this end, this chapter constructs new aggregate real commodity
price series from 1650 to 2010. The series are created by combining a new historical
dataset on the export values of 23 commodities, with the individual commodity price
dataset from Harvey et al. (2010). Subsequently, employing multiple break techniques
robust to whether or not each series contains a unit root, it is shown that the trend
path of these series can be partitioned into four regimes (i.e. 1650 to the early 1820s,
the early 1820s to the early 1870s, the early 1870s to the mid-1940s, and the mid-
1940s to 2010). A long-run downward trend is estimated in all but the second regime,
revealing that the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has relevance for the 17th, 18th and 20th
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centuries at least. However, it is also shown that the series declined at a slower rate
over the 17th and 18th centuries as compared with the 20th century, suggesting that
the economic forces underlying the hypothesis intensified over this recent period.
Secondly, we suggest that the new time series understanding can help clarify some
of the latent factors behind the trend. For example, from 1650 to the early 1820s
was a period of modest economic growth, particularly in the UK. This growth pro-
vided the demand for high-priced luxury goods like sugar and increasing supply from
the Caribbean allowed real prices to fall. By contrast, the 1820s to 1870s presented
stronger economic growth throughout the industrialising core. This increased demand
for primary commodities, allied to technological advances in manufacturing, saw a
terms of trade boom in the commodity-exporting periphery. However, our dating pro-
vides further evidence for the claims of Williamson (2008) that the periphery became
over-reliant on commodities at this time leading to local deindustrialisation. This is key
in understanding the larger decline in trend commodity prices post 1870 and through-
out most of the 20th century. Specifically, as the industrial core continued to grow,
oligopolistic manufacturing firms with market power at a global level pushed prices
lower as they interacted with far smaller, homogeneous primary commodity firms with
large supplies of labour at, or close to, the subsistence wage.
Thirdly, we posit that the trend growth rate of economic activity, data that is
available over an historical timeframe, is a useful proxy for the factors underlying the
trend in relative commodity prices. To this end, it is shown that breaks in the trend
growth rate of UK and World GDP are commensurate with those in the trend of
commodity prices. Moreover, a negative relationship between trends in commodity
prices and economic activity is estimated. For example, over our full sample, as World
GDP grew by one percent, the relative commodity prices fell by 0.43 percent. This
association helps explain the Great Divergence between the periphery and industrial
core over the 20th century, linking it closely to the resource curse.
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Finally, we note that although commodity prices were relatively high (compared to
trend) at the end of our sample, and even with super-cycles lasting around 31 years, the
empirical evidence in this chapter suggests that prices eventually revert to a negative
trend. Therefore, policymakers should be careful not to treat commodity-export income
as permanent. For example, a univariate time series model estimated using our data
would continue to forecast a negative trend over an infinite horizon. However, the
above explantion of the causal underpinnings of the trend suggests that this secular
decline might not continue indefinitely. The falling trend in real commodity prices since
1870 appears to be conditioned on an approximate separation between an industrial
core that imports primary commodities and a non-industrialised poor periphery that
supplies them. If recent developing country growth in China, India, Brazil, Africa and
elsewhere is used by policymakers to create permanently diversified economies, with
rising real wages and some global market power, then higher, relative commodity prices
could be supported over the future long-run.
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Data Appendix
The weighted average commodity price indices are constructed using export values
from developing countries as weights, over the period 1830-2006. The sources used are
as follows:
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1. 1830-1937. Principal source (for commodities Banana, Beef, Cocoa, Coffee, Cot-
ton, Hides, Jute, Oil, Pig Iron, Sugar, Tea, Tobacco, Wheat and Wool): Com-
modity Structure of Third World Exports 1830-1937, Paul Bairoch and Bouda
Etemad, Centre of International Economic History, University of Geneva.
2. 1830-1937. Secondary sources (for commodities Aluminum, Coal, Copper, Lamb,
Lead, Nickel, Rice, Tin and Zinc); imports to developed countries are used as a
proxy for exports from developing countries:
(a) US Geological Survey;
(b) Statistical Yearbook of Canada, 1899;
(c) Annuaire Statistique de la France, Vol. 19, 1899;
(d) Entwicklung und Strukturwandlungen des Englischen Außenhandels von
1700 bis zur Gegenwart, Werner Schlote, Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, Jena
Fischer, 1938;
(e) Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in Each of the Last Fifteen
Years from 1871 to 1885, HMSO, 1986.
3. 1950-2006. Sources (for all commodities):
(a) UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1951-1953;
(b) UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1978, Vol. 2;
(c) UNCTADstat Commodity Trade Matrix, 1995-2009.
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Table 1. Tests for a negative trend and estimated growth rates.
Panel A. 1650-2010
tRQFβ (MU ) Growth Rate (%) 90% c.i. 95% c.i. 99% c.i.
CCPI −16.67*** −0.90 −0.99,−0.81 −1.01,−0.80 −1.04,−0.76
CCPI′ −17.42*** −0.86 −0.94,−0.78 −0.96,−0.77 −0.99,−0.74
Panel B. 1900-2008
tRQFβ (MU ) Growth Rate (%) 90% c.i. 95% c.i. 99% c.i.
CCPI −0.25 −0.32 −2.40, +1.77 −2.79, +2.16 −3.56, +2.93
CCPI′ −0.37 −0.35 −1.87, +1.18 −2.16, +1.47 −2.73, +2.03
GYCPI −4.08*** −0.58 −0.81,−0.34 −0.85,−0.30 −0.94,−0.21
Note: *** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level.
Table 2. Sequential tests for multiple breaks in level/trend.
CCPI CCPI′
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s) FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 7.81*** 1820 8.99*** 1881
FT (2 |1) 8.09*** 1823, 1946 9.11*** 1823, 1946
FT (3 |2) 15.71*** 1820, 1872, 1946 15.64*** 1820, 1873, 1946
Note: *** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level.
Table 3. Tests for a negative trend in sub-sample regimes.
CCPI CCPI′
1650-1820 H0 : β = 0 −9.78*** −13.03***
1821-1872/3 H0 : β + γ1 = 0 −0.92 −2.03**
1873/4-1946 H0 : β + γ1 + γ2 = 0 −4.37*** −5.59***
1947-2010 H0 : β + γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 0 −2.29** −4.10***
Note: ** and *** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% significance
levels respectively.
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Table 4. Tests for a negative trend and estimated growth rates.
tRQFβ (MU ) Growth Rate (%) 90% c.i. 95% c.i. 99% c.i.
UK (1650-1870) 4.65*** 1.28 0.83, 1.74 0.74, 1.82 0.57, 1.99
World (1820-2009) 5.44*** 2.23 1.56, 2.91 1.43, 3.04 1.18, 3.29
China (1950-2009) 9.26*** 6.24 5.13, 7.35 4.92, 7.56 4.51, 7.96
Note: *** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level.
Table 5. Sequential tests for multiple breaks in level/trend.
UK (1650-1870)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 31.04*** 1790
FT (2 |1) 69.10*** 1773, 1817
World (1820-2009)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 15.13*** 1933
FT (2 |1) 23.73*** 1872, 1955
China (1950-2009)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 12.07*** 1976
Note: *** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level.
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Table 6. Summary measures of cyclical components.
Panel A. CCPI
s.d.(LCt) s.d.(SCt)
s.d.(LCt)
s.d.(SCt + LCt)
Mean periodicity (LCt) Mean periodicity (SCt)
1650-2010 0.147 0.097 0.832 27.273 4.140
1650-1872 0.098 0.095 0.709 26.571 4.255
1873-2010 0.194 0.099 0.888 31.500 4.094
1900-2010 0.220 0.108 0.895 31.500 3.815
Panel B. CCPI′
s.d.(LCt) s.d.(SCt)
s.d.(LCt)
s.d.(SCt + LCt)
Mean periodicity (LCt) Mean periodicity (SCt)
1650-2010 0.135 0.096 0.813 27.182 4.140
1650-1873 0.098 0.095 0.710 26.571 4.231
1874-2010 0.168 0.096 0.865 30.500 4.226
1900-2010 0.191 0.104 0.876 31.000 3.962
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Figure 1. Logarithms of CCPI and CCPI′, 1650-2010: CCPI, · · · CCPI′
Figure 2. Logarithms of CCPI, CCPI′ and GYCPI, 1900-2008: CCPI, · · · CCPI′, - - - GYCPI
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Figure 3. Logarithms of HPIM and MUV deflators, 1900-2008: HPIM, · · · MUV
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Figure 4. Logarithms of CCPI and fitted broken trend, 1650-2010: CCPI, - - - fitted values
Figure 5. Logarithms of CCPI′ and fitted broken trend, 1650-2010: CCPI′, - - - fitted values
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Figure 6. Logarithms of UK GDP and fitted broken trend, 1650-1870: GDP, - - - fitted values
Figure 7. Logarithms of World GDP and fitted broken trend, 1820-2009: GDP, - - - fitted values
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Figure 8. Logarithms of CCPI′ and fitted values from ’cointegrating’ regression, 1650-2009
Figure 9. Logarithms of China GDP and fitted broken trend, 1950-2009: GDP, - - - fitted values
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Figure 10. Cyclical components for CCPI, 1650-2010: LCt, · · ·LCt + SCt
Figure 11. Cyclical components for CCPI′, 1650-2010: LCt, · · ·LCt + SCt
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